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A number of recent cases have doubted the continued necessity of the implied term of 
reasonable notice in indefinite employment contracts, given the enactment of a 
national standard for minimum notice of termination of employment in the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth) s 117.  This article explains the challenge to reasonable notice, and 
proposes an alternative doctrinal basis for preserving an entitlement to reasonable 
notice in those admittedly rare cases in which an employee has been engaged for an 
apparently indefinite term with an implicit promise of long term job security. It is 
arranged in four Parts.  Part I outlines the overall argument. Part II explains the 
circumstances in which an entitlement to reasonable notice is claimed, and the cases 
which have recently rejected it. Part III summarises key arguments for retaining 
reasonable notice as an implied term, and Part IV proposes an alternative doctrinal 
basis to preserve an entitlement to reasonable notice in indefinite employment 
contracts. 
 
I  Reasonable Notice under Threat 
When senior employees face termination of their employment, they commonly claim an 
entitlement to ‘reasonable notice’, well in excess of the minimum notice periods set out in 
the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) s 117.2  For example, in Ma v Expeditors International 
Pty Ltd, decided by the New South Wales Supreme Court in 2014, a senior employee with no 
explicit notice clause in her employment contract was awarded damages recognising an 
entitlement to reasonable notice of ten months.3   Whether it is safe to continue to rely on 
this term long implied by law into employment contracts has been cast into doubt in recent 
years by a line of South Australian cases (chief among them the decision of a full bench in 
Brennan v Kangaroo Island Council4 followed in Kuczmarski v Ascot Administration Pty Ltd5), 
and some Federal Court decisions, which have suggested that an entitlement to reasonable 
2 
 
notice should no longer be implied, because either the statutory provision (s 117) or a 
modern award or enterprise bargain term has rendered such implication unnecessary.6  
Eminent authors have provided robust and convincing justifications for the maintenance of 
this implied term, notwithstanding the findings of the South Australian authorities (and 
those justifications are summarised in Part IV below).7  Nevertheless a niggling doubt 
remains, fuelled by a comprehensive review of the origins of the implied term by Buchanan J 
in Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg.8 Although Buchanan J did not expressly deny 
the existence of this implied term, he noted the finding in Brennan, and rejected counsel’s 
criticism of the case. ‘The essential point,’ said Buchanan J, ‘is that there was no gap to be 
filled by the implication’ of reasonable notice in that case.9 Unfortunately, the High Court 
refused leave to appeal from Brennan, stating that the ‘Full Court’s analysis is consistent 
with the statements in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd.10 An appeal to this court would not 
enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of special leave’.11 Of course, refusal 
of special leave does not create any precedent.12  It does however leave the Brennan 
decision standing as an appellate level precedent in a State Supreme Court. 
 
In Heldberg v Rand Transport (1986) Pty Ltd,13 White J found it unnecessary to 
decide whether to follow Brennan and Kuczmarski, because he found sufficient evidence of 
an express notice term to rely upon, without needing to imply any reasonable notice term.  
He did however opine that if these cases were correct it may be ‘an unforeseen 
consequence of the enactment of s 117’.14  More recently still, two Federal Circuit Court 
decisions, Nair v Queensland University of Technology15 and Carrabba v PFP (Aust) Pty Ltd,16 
have expressly followed Brennan and Kuczmarski.  In Carrabba, the court explicitly referred 
to the High Court’s refusal to grant special leave from Brennan as a reason for following the 
South Australian Court of Appeal’s decision.  Carrabba also cited Australian National Hotels 
v Jager,17 a case in which the Tasmanian Court of Appeal overturned an award of two years’ 
reasonable notice to a casino manager, and replaced it with the one month notice provided 
in the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas). (The High Court also refused leave to appeal from 
the Jager decision.18)   The decisions following Brennan and Kuczmarski are first instance 
decisions of the Federal Circuit Court and District Courts, and Wittenberg did not need to 
determine the issue.  We are yet to see an appellate Federal Court decision squarely on 
point.  The trouble is, most employees do not have the resources to mount appeals, 
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especially in a common law matter with the risk of an adverse costs order.19 This trickle of 
first instance decisions may well become the mainstream without a robust defence for the 
maintenance of the implied term of reasonable notice. Some have cited McGowan v Direct 
Mail and Marketing Pty Ltd,20 for that defence.  In McGowan, Judge McNab stated that s 
117 imposed only a minimum notice period and did not preclude a longer period of 
reasonable notice under contract, however this was obiter.  It was not necessary to imply a 
reasonable notice term in this case, because Mr McGowan’s original 1999 employment 
contract was held to provide an express notice term.21  And in Carrabba, the court stated 
that McGowan was ‘wrongly decided’.22 The risk remains that more courts hearing 
employment contract disputes will be persuaded by the reasoning in Brennan. 
 
A novel defence? 
This paper briefly considers the arguments for and against the implication of the reasonable 
notice term in the face of statutory notice periods.  Its main focus, however, is a proposal 
for an alternative doctrinal basis for a contractual entitlement to reasonable notice upon 
termination of an otherwise indefinite contract of employment.  Put shortly, this paper 
argues that if it is indeed unnecessary to imply a term of reasonable notice into indefinite 
employment contracts, now that a statutory provision has supposedly closed any ‘gap’, it is 
nevertheless justifiable to treat those contracts as continuing, so that any purported 
termination of the contract except by a negotiated agreement should be treated as a breach 
of contract attracting an entitlement on the part of the innocent party to an assessment of 
damages.  In other words, if an employment contract is entered into without the parties 
agreeing that it can be terminated by giving a certain amount of notice, no term allowing 
unilateral termination should be implied.  This may seem an unpalatable proposal.  Surely 
parties must be permitted to extricate themselves from a contract of service.  We do 
however now live in a world where statutory unfair dismissal protections and general 
protections of workplace rights contemplate potential reinstatement (and hence ‘jobs for 
life’) for employees who have been dismissed for capricious reasons.23  It is very easy for 
employers to make their intentions regarding termination on notice clear in express 
contractual terms.  So it will only be in the very rare case that parties have made no such 
provision, and have perhaps entered into an arrangement on the assumption of a long term 
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engagement, that this question will ever arise.  If it does, it is argued here that the parties 
should be left to the consequences of their own agreement, and the usual principles of 
contract law should be applied, without the implication of any terms.  
The usual principles of contract law mean that any assessment of damages for 
terminating the engagement without mutual agreement will require reasonable attempts at 
mitigation.  In all likelihood, such an assessment would produce the same result as the body 
of existing jurisprudence assessing reasonable notice, because the factors taken into 
account in assessing reasonable notice largely focus on the length of time required for the 
innocent party to find suitable alternative employment, or (in the case of an employer 
aggrieved by an employee’s unexpected resignation) to recruit a replacement staff 
member.24  
This argument is admittedly unorthodox, and requires some reassessment and 
reinterpretation of older authorities, so readers are kindly requested to suspend antagonism 
to the argument until it has been unpacked in its entirety. Its virtue, however, is that it 
provides a consistent rationale for the preservation of a legitimate expectation of a 
reasonable period of notice upon termination of an employment contract where no express 
contractual term permits termination upon giving notice, without the need for any implied 
term.  It does not depend on any heterodox assumption that employees are owed a 
contractual ‘right’ to reasonable notice in the absence of express provision for notice. It 
honours the clear delineation made in Byrne v  Australian Airlines25 between entitlements 
arising under contract and those determined by statute or statutory instruments.  It 
respects the position implicit in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker that terms must 
not be implied into employment contracts unless they conform with a strict test of 
necessity.26 It offers the collateral benefit of providing a basis for the sound principle, 
sometimes misunderstood, that the amount of notice required to terminate an indefinite 
employment contract need not be the same for both the employer and the employee, 
because the amount of time it will take employers to adjust to a resignation may well be 
considerably shorter than the time it will take a senior person to find acceptable alternative 
employment. The learned Mr Mark Irving asserts, with considerable justification, that a 
reasonable notice period will not necessarily be of the same duration for the employer as 
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the employee.27 In particular he cites Thorpe v South Australian National Football League28 
for that proposition.  
 
II  Challenges to reasonable notice 
In these days of word processing and standard form contracts it should be rare for any 
employment contract to lack a term, or indeed several terms, stipulating the circumstances 
in which the contract can be terminated by either party.  Nevertheless, in practice, claims 
for additional compensation for a period of reasonable notice are not uncommon when long 
standing staff are shown the door.  The case of Quinn v Jack Chia (Aust) Ltd29 is much to 
blame for this practice, because it is regularly cited as authority for the proposition that an 
express employment contract may have become stale with the effluxion of time, and where 
the employee’s salary, duties and seniority have changed.   In such a case it is regularly 
argued in negotiations for severance pay that the notice period stipulated in the former 
written contract no longer applies, and the parties are bound instead by an implied term 
that each must give ‘reasonable notice’ in order to terminate the contract, absent an 
agreement.   
The now largely defunct unfair contracts jurisdiction under the Industrial Relations 
Act 1996 (NSW) s 106 and its predecessors may bear some blame for the proliferation of 
such arguments in New South Wales.  A short notice period sometimes supported an 
argument that the contract in question was relevantly unfair and susceptible to review, 
particularly where the reason for termination was an alleged redundancy.30  Law firms 
practising in this area kept ‘reasonable notice calculation tables’ among their precedents, to 
provide a rough approximation of how much notice an executive could claim 
(notwithstanding an express contract term), bearing in mind age, seniority, length of service, 
level of remuneration and all the other factors indicated in cases such as Quinn.31 Unfair 
contracts review for private sector employees is now largely a dead letter, following the 
enactment first of the Workplace Relations (Work Choices) Amendment Act 2005 (Cth) and 
then the FW Act which have overridden State industrial laws for national system 
employment.32  Nevertheless the shadow of s 106 still clouds the expectations of some 
employment law practitioners in New South Wales. Whatever the reason, claims for 
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reasonable notice of up to a year are still commonly made on behalf of long serving 
managers, on the basis that Quinn is still good law.33 If Brennan, Kuczmarski and Wittenberg 
continue to be followed, however, these claims may prove futile. 
Brennan 
Ms Brennan was a Human Resources Manager employed by the Kangaroo Island Council on 
a salary of approximately $120,000 a year, which meant that her position was not covered 
by the Council’s enterprise agreement.34  When her position was made redundant just 
under four years after appointment, she brought a contract claim for severance pay that 
included an amount of between 12 to 18 months for reasonable notice.  At first instance, 
Judge Cole determined that Ms Brennan’s employment was governed by a South Australian 
award which provided a notice period of three weeks. Judge Cole expressly rejected  
counsel’s submission that ‘a term requiring that reasonable notice be given in the event of a 
redundancy was an implied term of all employment contracts which did not contain an 
express term dealing with notice, or payment in lieu of notice, on redundancy’.35  Judge Cole 
said there was no evidence that such a term should be implied as a matter of custom, and 
that it failed the five step test set out in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Hastings Shire 
Council36 for a term implied in fact.37 She held that there was ample evidence, from the 
parties’ correspondence, that those matters were intended to be governed by the award, so 
she allowed only three weeks in respect of notice.  If Ms Brennan’s employment had not 
been covered by the award, Judge Cole said she would have awarded six months as 
reasonable notice of a decision to make her redundant.38 
 It is interesting that Judge Cole did not expressly consider the possibility that the 
reasonable notice term should be implied by law (rather than in fact or by custom). This may 
have been because the claim was for reasonable notice of a redundancy, and not merely 
reasonable notice of termination.  There is, after all, ample authority supporting the 
existence of a term implied by law that all indefinite employment contracts may be 
terminated upon reasonable notice.39 It is not clear why the employer’s reason for deciding 
to terminate the employment prematurely (whether for redundancy, or some capricious 
reason) should have any bearing on whether reasonable notice of termination should be 
implied. In any event, Judge Cole would have awarded six months’ notice in the absence of 
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an award clause, implying that the common law would fill the gap with an implied term of 
reasonable notice in a case of redundancy.    
On appeal the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia upheld Judge 
Cole’s decision.  Parker J (with whom Vanstone and Anderson JJ agreed) said that no 
evidence had been brought of any term implied by custom.40 He also agreed that a 
reasonable notice clause would not pass the BP Refinery test for implication in fact.41 While 
acknowledging that the High Court in Byrne held that common law employment contracts 
operate separately from awards, so that award clauses are not incorporated as contract 
terms, he nevertheless held that the existence of an award clause providing for notice of 
termination precluded any necessity for implication of a term in the contract.  
Perhaps the most devastating observation in Parker J’s reasons is the reference 
(without express quotation) to an obiter statement by Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ in 
Byrne, that an award clause prescribing the applicable notice periods for the baggage 
handlers in that case ‘preclude[d] the implication of a term that reasonable notice be 
given’.42  And if it had not precluded the implication of reasonable notice, it ‘might provide 
evidence of what constitutes reasonable notice at common law’.43 This statement assumes 
that an applicable award clause either negates any need for implication of a contractual 
notice term, or supplies the content of that term by indicating what is ‘reasonable’ between 
the parties to an employment relationship that is governed by an industrial award. 
Parker J also cited other cases which refused to imply a reasonable notice term 
where an industrial instrument applied,44 and dismissed a case which did (Westen v Union 
Des Assurances De Paris (No 2)45) as inconsistent with Byrne.46 
Wittenberg 
The next serious threat to the implication of reasonable notice came in Buchanan J’s 
reasons concerning the implied term of reasonable notice in Westpac Banking Corporation v 
Wittenberg.47 In Wittenberg the issue for resolution was whether executives made 
redundant as a consequence of a bank merger were able to claim an amount of severance 
pay in respect of reasonable notice of termination. Buchanan J held that there was no scope 
for implication of reasonable notice because a notice period was already specified in written 
employment contracts.48 These contracts continued to govern the employment 
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relationships, and had not been superseded by any unwritten contract, so there were no 
grounds to apply Quinn.49 In the course of reaching that conclusion, Buchanan J made 
several observation about the implication of reasonable notice that have a bearing on the 
findings in Brennan.  
 First he explained the relatively recent historical origins of this implied term. It was 
first proposed in 1969 by the English Court of Appeal in Richardson v Koefod,50 in order to 
dispense with the earlier presumption ‘that a contract of employment for an indefinite 
period endured at least from year to year and was automatically renewed on the 
anniversary of the contract unless brought to an end on that date’.51  The new rule was that 
‘[i]n the absence of express stipulation  . . . every contract of service is determinable by 
reasonable notice’.52  This was followed in Australia in Thorpe v South Australian National 
Football League53 in 1974.  The genesis of the term demonstrates that it functioned 
principally as a right to terminate an apparently indefinite employment contract. It did not 
arise out of any concern to ensure that employees received reasonable notice of 
termination of their employment. 
Buchanan J went on to describe many cases where there was no need to imply a 
right to terminate upon reasonable notice, either because other terms of the contract 
indicated a mutual intention that the contract was for a fixed term,54 or because provisions 
of a statute or an industrial award dealt with termination on notice.55  He also cited Byrne, 
emphasising that the implication of reasonable notice applied ‘in the absence of any 
provision in the award and of any express provision in the contract’.56 
Wittenberg did not need to determine whether FW Act s 117 had any effect on these 
executives’ contracts, because it was readily found that their written employment contracts 
continued to prescribe notice periods, notwithstanding their claim that these contracts had 
become irrelevant.  Wittenberg was nevertheless cited in Kuczmarski in support of a finding 
that reasonable notice ought not to be implied in the face of the statutory notice period. 
Kuczmarski 
Kuczmarksi concerned a private sector employee who did not have a written employment 
contract and whose employment was not covered by any modern award.  His position was 
made redundant, and he was provided with five weeks’ pay in lieu of notice calculated 
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according to FW Act s 117(3).57 He challenged this on the basis that he should be paid 
between 12 and 18 months’ pay in lieu of the reasonable notice that was implied by law into 
his unwritten employment contract. Judge Clayton of the District Court of South Australia 
followed Brennan (which he said he was bound to do58), notwithstanding that Brennan 
concerned an applicable award clause, and there was no award here. His reasons drew on 
the passages in Byrne (cited above59), and in Wittenberg. He distinguished Guthrie v News 
Limited on the basis that Mr Guthrie’s contract, being one for a fixed term of three years, 
was excluded from the application of s 117 by FW Act 123(1) (which provides that the 
Division does not apply to employment for a specified period of time).60 Judge Clayton 
accepted the submissions made on behalf of the employer that the reasonable notice term 
was no longer ‘necessary’, according to the understanding of necessity explained by French 
CJ, Bell and Keane JJ in Barker, because s 117 now provided an orderly means for permitting 
termination of an indefinite employment contract.61 He also noted Buchanan J’s apparent 
approval of Brennan and Jager in Wittenberg.62 Finally, he distinguished Thorpe on the basis 
that when Thorpe was decided in 1974 there was no statutory provision to fill the gap.63 In 
the result, although Kuczmarski (being a District Court decision) is not a strong precedent in 
itself, its demolition of arguments in favour of the implication of reasonable notice presents 
a clear challenge to the arguments mounted by Irving, and Roeger and Stewart in support of 
the implied term.64  
 
III Support for reasonable notice 
Others have mounted a persuasive defence of maintenance of an implication of reasonable 
notice notwithstanding the enactment of a national standard for notice in s 117.65  Readers 
are referred to those excellent commentaries, so those arguments will not all be rehearsed 
here, but it is useful to note some key points.  The strongest argument in favour of 
maintaining the implied term lies in the terms of the statutory provision itself. Strictly 
construed, s 117 does not confer upon an employer a positive right to terminate an 
indefinite employment contract.  It provides only that ‘[a]n employer must not terminate an 
employee’s employment unless the employer has given the employee written notice of the 
day of termination’, and ‘must not terminate the employee’s employment unless: (a) the 
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time between giving the notice and the day of the termination is at least the period (the 
minimum period of notice)’ set out in a table in sub-s (3).66  Section 117 therefore applies 
regardless of any contrary stipulation in a contract between the parties.  Section 123 
provides that Division 11, in which s 117 appears, does not apply to employees employed 
for a specified time or a specified task, so a person employed for a fixed term or a special 
project will not be covered by this provision, and by implication, their employer will not be 
able to terminate the fixed term or project engagement prematurely by giving notice under 
s 117.  
 The minimum periods stipulated in s 117 do not override express stipulations in 
awards, enterprise agreements, or common law employment contracts to the extent that 
those provisions provide more generous notice periods. Section 55 of the FW Act deals with 
the relationship between the NES and modern awards and enterprise agreements (which 
also provide minimum entitlements for employees covered by those instruments).  Section 
55(6) stipulates that NES entitlements operate as minimum standards.  Modern awards and 
enterprise agreements may provide terms that are more beneficial to employees.67  By 
logical extension, common law employment contracts may also provide for more beneficial 
notice periods, or may promise continuing employment with termination only permitted for 
cause.   
 The NES, modern awards, enterprise agreements, and common law employment 
contracts provide for distinct avenues of complaint and their own remedies if breached. 
Breach of a provision of the NES offends s 44 of the Act, which is a civil remedy provision 
attracting potential penalties under Pt 4-1, s 539 of the Act.  Breach of an award or 
enterprise agreement triggers the dispute resolution processes contained in the award or 
agreement and may also give rise to civil penalties or other statutory remedies.  Only a 
breach of contract will give rise to a claim for expectation-based damages under the 
common law, as Byrne made clear.  Byrne also clarified that statutory instruments operate 
concurrently with, but separately from common law contracts.68 They will not form part of 
an employment contract unless specifically incorporated as contract terms.  Given the 
limited application of s 117, and the clear delineation in our system of employment law 
between statutory entitlements and common law obligations, there is arguably no ground 
for assuming any statutory intention to oust an established term implied by law into 
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employment contracts, especially as the High Court in Barker acknowledged that reasonable 
notice had already been accepted into the limited canon of terms implied by law into 
employment contracts. 69   
As we have seen above, however, these arguments have not dissuaded some courts 
from finding otherwise in recent times.  The chief enemy of reasonable notice is the notion 
that a term will only be implied into an employment contract where there is a gap that must 
necessarily be filled.  Courts may only fill a gap with a term that is both consistent with the 
presumed intentions of the parties,70 and is necessary ‘to make the contract effectively 
operative’.71 Since the contract can operate (however unsatisfactorily) on the basis that the 
statute provides the required notice for termination by an employer, those who wish to 
champion continued claims for reasonable notice in indefinite employment contracts may 
need a new doctrinal basis for claiming reasonable notice that does not depend upon 
implying a term in fact or by law. 
 
IV  An alternative doctrinal basis 
Even if Brennan and Kuczmarksi have been correctly decided, and Buchanan J in Wittenberg 
is correct in doubting any need to imply a term of reasonable notice where statute closes 
the gap, there is a sound basis for claiming that a party to an indefinite employment 
contract should be compensated by payment for a period of reasonable notice if the other 
party unilaterally terminates the contract prematurely.  It is an argument that will rarely 
arise, and will no longer justify a claim for reasonable notice in a Quinn situation, where the 
employment contract is said to have become stale over time.  The room for making an 
argument that an existing written contract of employment should be ignored because the 
relationship has evolved over time has narrowed considerably, following cases such as 
Wittenberg, and Easling v Mahoney Insurance Brokers.72 Parties who have already 
committed the terms of their relationship to writing, and who have agreed the terms upon 
which it can be concluded, have little ground for grievance when the relationship ends and 
those terms are applied. However where an employee is engaged on an open-ended 
contract, with no termination provisions stipulated, and possibly with warm encouragement 
to see the position as a ‘job for life’, there is an argument for supporting a claim to 
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compensation for reasonable notice. Such an employee has a legitimate complaint if their 
long term commitment to an enterprise is cut short for no good reason with no more than 
the statutory one to five weeks’ notice period to adjust. How should the common law deal 
with a complaint of this nature? 
Let us start with the proposition that the implied term permitting termination of an 
indefinite employment contract on reasonable notice is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
invented to counter the inconvenient presumption of yearly hiring.73  This judicial 
innovation suited the reasonable expectations of employers and employees in the world of 
work in the 1960s, when yearly hiring was an anachronism, but even the IBM golf ball 
typewriter had not yet been invented to facilitate easy preparation of written employment 
contracts. That world has evolved further in sixty years.  We now live in a world where it is 
extremely easy for an employer to provide an employee with written terms of employment.  
Managers of even the smallest of businesses can tap out basic provisions with thumbs on a 
smart phone keypad, if they wish to limit their contractual obligations to employees.  We 
also live in a world where for the past thirty odd years, many employees have become 
accustomed to an expectation of a level of job security.  Statutory unfair dismissal laws have 
promoted an assumption that employees may not be capriciously dismissed. Unless an 
employer has a valid reason based on the employee’s conduct or competence, or the 
operational needs of the enterprise, permanent employees expect to enjoy continuing 
employment. And human resource managers know they need to be able to establish 
evidence of good reasons before dismissing staff. 
In this 21st century world, it is arguable that there is no longer any reason to imply a 
term permitting unilateral termination of an indefinite employment contract.  The parties’ 
failure to stipulate termination provisions may be taken as an indication of an intention to 
continue the relationship until such time as they mutually agree to separate. The natural 
consequence of the parties’ decision not to agree termination provisions in their contract at 
the outset is that a purported unilateral termination without cause would be a breach of the 
contract.  There is no apparent necessity for a court to step in to  manage a risk that the 
parties might easily have managed themselves by stipulating termination provisions.  As 
Buchanan J said in Wittenberg: ‘The courts have not set out to rewrite individual contracts 
of employment.’74 
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This does not mean that the parties to an indefinite employment contract will be 
yoked together in perpetual misery as a consequence of neglecting to make their own 
severance terms.  Another firmly established principle of the common law is that contracts 
for personal services will not attract the remedy of specific performance, nor any injunctive 
orders that would require an employee to continue to serve, or an employer to continue to 
accept service.75 This common law principle has been maintained, notwithstanding 
acceptance of actual reinstatement of employees to their jobs under statutory unfair 
dismissal laws.76  The remedy for breach of an indefinite employment contract will always 
be damages (and possibly an injunction requiring the contract to remain on foot, without 
any obligation to serve, if there are special reasons for such a finding77). 
A further established principle of contract law would limit claims to ensure that 
employees would not be entitled to lost salary until an anticipated retirement age: the duty 
to mitigate.78 Mitigation means that an employee will only be able to claim damages for the 
amount of time it would reasonably take that person to find alternative employment, taking 
into account an obligation to be reasonably diligent in the search. Factors such as age, 
seniority, length of service would all contribute to that calculation.  Likewise, an employer 
aggrieved by a resignation would be entitled to claim damages for the period of time it 
would take them to engage replacement staff, and factors such as the specialised nature of 
the skills required would affect that calculation.79 Damages for unilateral termination of an 
indefinite employment contract would therefore attract damages calculated on the very 
same principles as breach of the implied term of reasonable notice.  We have come full 
circle, but without the need to invent any implied terms. 
The conceptual benefit of this approach is that it avoids any judicial contract 
rewriting whatsoever.  The parties to employment contracts are held only to those terms 
that they create for themselves. It permits a clean separation between common law rights 
and remedies and statutory entitlements, and so respects the High Court’s decisions in both 
Byrne and Barker.   
In deference to Byrne, this approach ensures that neither the NES minima nor any 
award or enterprise bargain will be taken to trespass into the territory of private contract 
law.  Parties who wish to adopt the provisions of the NES or an applicable industrial 
instrument as contract terms will need to incorporate those provisions expressly into their 
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employment contracts.  This is a simple matter, requiring no more than confirmation with 
employees of an agreement to that effect.   
 Much ink has been spent in analysis of Barker.80 One thing is clear from that 
decision: the High Court has turned its face against the development of any ’transformative 
approach’ to the common law employment contract.81 Far better to leave matters 
concerning ‘social conditions and desirable social policy’ to the legislature.82 To date the 
legislature has made no prescription about the desirable length of notice for indefinite 
employment contracts.  It has determined minimum periods in FW Act s 117, so that any 
shorter periods stipulated in employment contracts will not be enforceable. FW Act s 55(6) 
expressly contemplates that parties to enterprise agreements (a form of collective contract) 
may agree longer periods, and if so, those longer periods will be binding. The legislature has 
clearly set a minimum only, and leaves it to the parties themselves to determine their own 
arrangements above the safety net.  If the parties themselves make no express provision for 
termination of a contract at all, there is no justification (on Barker’s reasoning) for a court 
exercising common law jurisdiction to invent a risk mitigation tool in the form of an 
implication of a right to terminate on reasonable notice. There is no necessity for the 
common law to fill the supposed ‘gap’ with a provision from a separate, statutory branch of 
the law. There is no injustice in leaving the parties to the consequences of their own 
decisions if they have entered their relationship on the mutual assumption of ongoing 
employment, terminable only by agreement or for cause. 
From a practical perspective, this solution may encourage employers to be more 
transparent in their dealings with new recruits, lest their representations of secure long 
term employment, implicitly supported by the absence of any termination clauses in a 
written employment contract, deceive those employees who are not aware of the existence 
of a niggardly statutory provision allowing no more than one to five weeks’ pay in lieu of 
notice upon termination.   
An illustration: Tran v Kodari Securities Pty Ltd83 
It will be a rare case where an employer has not taken the precaution of setting out 
termination provisions in a written employment contract, but such cases do arise 
occasionally, especially where the employer and employee are engaged in a close and 
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trusting relationship.  In Tran v Kodari Securities Pty Ltd, a personal body guard was engaged 
by a wealthy businessman (Kodari) to undertake a range of duties, including setting up and 
maintaining business systems and supervising other staff.  He was given the title Chief 
Operations Officer and was paid a salary of $150,000 per annum, plus other benefits, but for 
the first 18 months he was given no written contract outlining the terms of his appointment.   
After about 18 months Mr Kodari presented him with a thick document purporting to be a 
new employment contract. When Mr Tran asked for some time to obtain legal advice before 
signing the document, he was sacked unceremoniously, and the employer subsequently 
alleged that his request for time before signing was a resignation.  Bromwich J held that the 
employer had taken adverse action against Mr Tran,84 and awarded appropriate remedies, 
but in the alternative, also held that the employer had breached the original unwritten 
employment contract. Bromwich J said that Mr Tran had been employed indefinitely in a 
highly trusted position. Given his ‘age and the time that it should have taken him to find 
alternative equivalent employment, a reasonable notice period would have been six 
months’.85 The case was determined on the basis that there was an implied term of 
reasonable notice in his unwritten contract, and the principles in Guthrie v News Limited86 
were applicable to determine a reasonable notice period.  There was no consideration of 
the potential application of FW Act s 117, and no reference to Brennan or Wittenberg, so 
this case does not assist us in determining whether the implied term of reasonable notice is 
likely to survive, at least in the federal jurisdiction. It does however provide a useful 
illustration of the kinds of factual scenarios that still occasionally arise, and in which serious 
injustice may be done if the implication of reasonable notice is squeezed out of existence by 
s 117. If there is to be no implication of the obligation to provide reasonable notice, then let 
there be no implication of an entitlement to terminate on reasonable notice, either. 
 
Conclusion 
Brennan, Kuczmarski, Wittenberg, and a few other recent cases have threatened the 
customary practice whereby employees seek payment in lieu of a reasonable period of 
notice when they have been dismissed without the benefit of any clearly applicable 
termination provisions in an employment contract.87 As White J opined in Heldberg v Rand 
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Transport (1986) Pty Ltd,88 this may be an unforeseen consequence of the enactment of a 
national standard for minimum notice periods in FW Act s 117. The best solution to this 
problem would be amendment to the FW Act to clarify that s 117 does not purport to 
substitute the NES minima for reasonable notice periods determined by common law 
principles, but such an amendment seems most unlikely in the current political climate. 
Another solution may be to press the courts more firmly with the arguments already 
mounted so eloquently by eminent scholars in this field.89 The more radical alternative 
proposed in this article is to accept the arguments of Buchanan J in Wittenberg, but to go a 
step further by abolishing the implied term in its entirety, so that it no longer applies to 
permit unilateral termination of an indefinite employment contract. It is easy enough for an 
employer to stipulate a right to terminate, either absolutely or according to particular 
conditions, in an employment contract.  An employer who chooses not stipulate any right to 
terminate upon giving notice must be taken to have contemplated an indefinite contract, 
terminable only by agreement.  Unilateral termination would therefore be a technical 
breach of contract, giving rise to an entitlement to contractual damages.   
It is, admittedly, a jarring thought that a contract of employment that stipulates no 
right to terminate should be treated as giving rise to an entitlement to life-long 
employment.  But this is ameliorated by the application of a number of orthodox principles 
of common contract law that ensure that the parties will not be yoked together till kingdom 
come.  The first principle is that courts will not specifically enforce contracts for personal 
services, so the remedy for breach of an indefinite employment contract will invariably be 
an award of appropriate damages.  The second is that the parties will be obliged to make 
reasonable attempts to mitigate their losses, by seeking out alternative employment, or, in 
the case of an employer aggrieved by a premature resignation, by recruiting a replacement. 
This would mean that the measure of damages would be the same as the market is already 
well accustomed to, given that the body of precedent concerning reasonable notice already 
measures the entitlement to notice according to how long it would take to find alternative 
employment, or recruit new staff. 
When one considers that as recently as 1974 in Australia, an employment contract 
containing no termination provisions could be treated as a yearly hiring, perhaps this 
proposal is not so radical at all.  We do now live in a world where statutory unfair dismissal 
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protections and general protections of workplace rights contemplate potential 
reinstatement of employees who have been dismissed for capricious reasons.  Perhaps it is 
time to encourage a judiciary who (following Barker) have already abdicated their role in 
determining terms implied by law in employment, to vacate the field entirely, by leaving the 
parties to the consequence of their own agreements.  Let Parliament legislate for any such 
implied terms, if ‘desirable social policy’ so demands. 
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